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02-749 Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez
Ruling Below: (Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 9th Cir., 298 F.3d 1030, 71 U.S.L.W.
1032, 13 A.D. Cas. 198)
Employer's unwritten policy against rehiring former employees who were terminated for any
violation of its misconduct rules, although not unlawful on its face, violates Americans with
Disabilities Act as applied to successfully rehabilitated former drug addicts whose only work-
related offense was testing positive because of their addiction.
Question Presented: Does Americans with Disabilities Act confer preferential rehire rights on
employees lawfully terminated for misconduct, such as illegal drug use?
Joel HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
HUGHES MISSILE SYSTEMS COMPANY, an Arizona corporation; Hughes Aircraft
Company, a Delaware corporation; Raytheon Company, a Delaware corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted Feb. 14, 2002.
Decided June 11, 2002.
Amended Aug. 12, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge.
In July 1991, Plaintiff Joel Hernandez was
given a drug test at his place of employment and
tested positive for cocaine. He had worked for
the Defendant, Hughes Missile Systems
Company ("Hughes") for approximately twenty-
five years, first as a janitor, and at the time of
his positive drug test, as a Calibration Service
Technician. Hughes was also aware at this time
that Hernandez struggled with an alcohol
problem. Rather than being terminated,
Hernandez was given the option to resign in lieu
of termination, which he chose to do. On the
"Employee Separation Summary" filled out at
the time of his resignation, was the handwritten
note that Hernandez "quit in lieu of discharge"
and that the reason for his leaving was
"discharge for personal conduct."
Over two years passed and on January 24,
1994, Hernandez applied to be rehired by
Hughes as a Calibration Service Technician or a
Product Test Specialist.2 Hughes rejected the
application. Subsequently, in June 1994,
2 At that time, there were seven openings for the position
of Product Test Specialist.
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Hernandez filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), alleging that his application was
rejected because of his disability, specifically,
because of his record of drug addiction. The
EEOC issued a right to sue letter. Hernandez
then filed this action under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the district court
granted Hughes's motion for summary
judgment. We reverse.
When Hernandez applied to be rehired, he
attached to his application a copy of his resumd
and two reference letters. The first letter was
from a pastor of Hernandez's church. It stated
that Hernandez was a "faithful and active
member." The second letter was from John L.
Lyman, M.S., a counselor who stated that he
works with recovering alcoholics and that
Hernandez attends A.A. regularly, maintains his
sobriety, and has a strong commitment to his
recovery. On his application, Hernandez
checked the "yes" box in response to the
question whether the applicant had previously
worked for Hughes.
Hernandez's application was forwarded to
Hughes's Labor Relations Department where it
was reviewed by Ms. Joanne Bockmiller.
Because Hernandez indicated that he had
previously worked for Hughes, Bockmiller
testified in her deposition that she pulled his
personnel file and reviewed his employee
separation sheet. She stated that once she saw
that he "quit-in-lieu of discharge," she
concluded that he was ineligible for rehire.
Bockmiller testified that she made this decision
based on the company's unwritten policy of not
rehiring former employees whose employment
ended due to termination or resignation in lieu
of termination. 4 Bockmiller testified that at the
4 It is not clear on the record before us the difference
between "termination" and "resignation in lieu of
termination." Although there may be a difference in
terms of what former employees can report to future
potential employers, for the purposes here--the rehiring of
time she made the decision not to rehire
Hernandez, she did not know the grounds for, or
the conduct underlying, his resignation.
Hughes submitted a statement to the EEOC in
response to Hernandez's charge. On July 15,
1994, George Medina, Manager of Diversity
Development for Hughes, wrote that
"[Hernandez's] application was rejected based
on his demonstrated drug use while previously
employed and the complete lack of evidence
indicating successful drug rehabilitation." The
letter went on to state that "[t]he Company
maintains it's [sic] right to deny re-employment
to employees terminated for violation of
Company rules and regulations." On
November 20, 1997, the EEOC issued a
determination on the merits of Hernandez's
complaint. The EEOC found "reasonable cause
to believe that [Hernandez] was denied hire ...
because of his disability."
Following Hernandez's filing of this action on
July 6, 1998, Hughes asserted that he had failed
to make aprimafacie case of discrimination. It
further argued that even if he had established a
prima facie case, he had failed to demonstrate
that its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for
not rehiring him was a pretext for
discrimination. After hearing oral argument on
Hughes's summary judgment motion, the district
court granted it without any explanation of its
reasons for doing so. Hernandez appealed.6
Hernandez argues that, in rejecting his
application for rehire, Hughes discriminated
against him on the basis of a disability in
violation of Title I of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §
former employees--there appears to be no difference in
Hughes's treatment of employees who were terminated as
opposed to those who resigned under threat of
termination.
6 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.
Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Assoc., 239 F.3d 1128,
1133 (9th Cir.2001).
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12112 (2002). In order to establish a primafacie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that 1) he is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA; 2) he is a qualified
individual able to perform the essential
functions of the job; and 3) his employer
terminated or refused to rehire him because of
his disability. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1999). With
regard to the first element, a "disability" under
the ADA is defined as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.
§ 12102(2). Hernandez does not claim that he
was actually disabled at the time he applied to
be rehired by Hughes in 1994. Rather, he
argues that he was not rehired because of his
record of disability, and/or because he was
regarded as being disabled. See § 12102(2);
Thompson v. Davis, 282 F.3d 780, 784 (9th
Cir.2002). Thus, in order to make aprimafacie
case, Hernandez must present sufficient
evidence that he was not rehired by Hughes
because of his record of drug addiction or
because he was perceived as being a drug
addict, as well as demonstrating that he is
qualified for the position he seeks.9
9 Although it is possible that a drug user may not be
"disabled" under the ADA if his drug use does not rise to
the level of an addiction which substantially limits one or
more of his major life activities, in this case, it is not
disputed that Hernandez was a drug addict and that his
positive drug test formed a record of his addiction. In
other words, it is not disputed that Hernandez was
"disabled" within the meaning of the ADA at the time he
resigned in lieu of termination, and a record of that
disability existed. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 ("The phrase
physical or mental impairment includes ... drug addiction,
and alcoholism."); Thompson v. Davis, 282 F.3d 780, 784
(9th Cir.2002) ("Drug addiction that substantially limits
one or more major life activities is a recognized disability
under the ADA."); Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d
Hernandez points to Hughes's position
statement to the EEOC as direct evidence that
he was not rehired because of his record of drug
addiction. As mentioned previously, in this
statement Hughes wrote that "[Hemandez's]
application was rejected based on his
demonstrated drug use while previously
employed." It also stated that Hernandez was
discharged for violating Rule and Regulation
No. 7 which states:
Unauthorized or unlawful manufacture,
distribution, dispensing, sale, possession,
consumption, use or being under the influence
of alcohol, a controlled substance or illegal
drug during working time, while performing
work for the Company or at any time on
Company premises; or testing positive for
alcohol or drugs on a test requested by the
Company.
(emphasis in Hughes's original letter to the
EEOC).
Hughes argues in response that its position
statement was written by Mr. Medina, an
employee who did not make the actual decision
whether or not to rehire Hernandez, and that
therefore we should consider only the testimony
of Ms. Bockmiller, the employee who reviewed
Hernandez's application. However, given the
inferences that must be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party, even Bockmiller's testimony
does not unequivocally support Hughes's
position that Hernandez failed to make a prima
facie showing of discrimination. It is true that
Bockmiller testified that she did not know of
Hernandez's history of drug addiction or of the
reason for his leaving the company in 1991.
1182, 1187 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that alcoholism is a
protected disability under ADA); Mararri v. WCI Steel,
Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1185 (6th Cir.1997) ("There is no
dispute that alcoholism is a disability within the
protection of the ADA.").
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However, she also testified that at the time of
her review she pulled Hernandez's entire
personnel file, which would have included the
1991 drug test results. She also stated that,
although she did not remember what Hernandez
attached to his application, she would have seen
any materials he submitted, which included the
letter from his A.A. counselor. It would be
reasonable to infer from the presence of this
letter that Bockmiller was aware of the fact that
Hernandez was a recovering alcoholic and that,
with that knowledge, she would have checked
the personnel file to determine the reason for his
earlier termination. In short, the Bockmiller
evidence, which itself permits an inference that
she was aware of Hernandez's positive drug test,
does not eliminate the question of fact that
arises as a result of Hughes's explicit statements
to the EEOC that the application was rejected
because of Hernandez's prior drug addiction.
Thus, Hernandez raises a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether he was denied re-
employment because of his past record of drug
addiction.
Hernandez must also demonstrate that he was a
"qualified" individual for the job for which he
sought rehire, that is, he must demonstrate that
he has the "requisite skill, experience, education
and other job-related requirements of the
employment position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
In 1991, when Hernandez resigned, his
Employee Separation Sheet rated his work
performance as both "good" and "fair.""
Hernandez argues that because he performed his
job satisfactorily for many years and had
previously served in the position of Product Test
Specialist, he should be deemed "qualified"
under the ADA. Hughes agrees with Hernandez
" Out of four categories--excellent, good, fair, and, poor--
Hernandez's ability was rated "good," his conduct, "fair,"
and his production, "fair." Given that these ratings were
for the period in which Hernandez struggled with drug
and alcohol problems, it would be reasonable to infer that
he had the ability to be a far better than average employee
at the time of his "resignation."
as to his ability in 1991. However, it disputes
his qualifications at the time he sought rehire in
1994. In February 1999, after Hernandez filed
this action, Hughes offered him the position of
Product Test Specialist if he passed the
necessary examination. Although Hernandez
was given time to study and prepare for the
exam, upon taking it he completed only four out
of eight sections and failed to receive a passing
score on any of them. Hughes argues that in
light of the 1999 test results, there is no genuine
issue as to whether Hernandez was qualified at
the time he sought rehire in 1994.'1 Hernandez
argues on the other hand that simply because he
failed the examination in 1999 does not mean he
would have failed it in 1994, a date considerably
closer to the time during which he satisfactorily
performed the job. Thus, the dispute boils
down to the fact that Hernandez was qualified
for the job in 1991 and was not qualified in
1999. We believe that, given these two facts,
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he was qualified in 1994."
In sum, we hold that, with respect to
Hemandez's prima facie case of discrimination,
he presented sufficient evidence to preclude a
grant of summary judgment. Accordingly, the
burden switched to Hughes to offer a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d
207 (1981); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330,
13 The examination given in 1999 was identical to the one
Hernandez would have taken in 1994 had he not been
found ineligible for rehire.
'5 Notwithstanding its letter to the EEOC, Hughes does
not contend in its brief on appeal that Hernandez is not a
qualified individual because he has failed to show that he
has been rehabilitated and is no longer taking drugs. See
§ 12114(b). We note, however, that the letter from A.A.
that Hernandez submitted along with his application, and
his own affidavit to the effect that he is now drug and
alcohol free, are sufficient to give rise to a genuine issue
of fact as to that question.
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1340 (9th Cir.1990).
Hughes states that Hernandez was not rehired
because of its unwritten company policy not to
rehire employees who were terminated or
resigned in lieu of discharge due to their
violation of the company's code of conduct.
Hughes argues that this unwritten policy is not
discriminatory against Hernandez or any other
former employee who once had a drug problem
because it does not single out such employees or
treat them differently from employees who
violated other personal conduct rules (such as
fighting or stealing from the company).
Although the ADA does not protect an
employee or applicant who is currently
engaging in illegal drug use, see § 2114(a), it
does protect qualified individuals with a drug
addiction who have been successfully
rehabilitated. See § 12114(b); U.S. EEOC, A
Technical Assistance Manual on the
Employment Provisions (Title I) of the
Americans with Disabilities Act § 8.2, 8.5
(1992) [hereinafter EEOC Manual] ("An
employer may not discriminate against a drug
addict, who is not currently using drugs and
who has been rehabilitated, because of a history
of drug addiction."). Thus, Hughes's unwritten
policy against rehiring former employees who
were terminated for any violation of its
misconduct rules, although not unlawful on its
face, violates the ADA as applied to former
drug addicts whose only work-related offense
was testing positive because of their addiction.
If Hernandez is in fact no longer using drugs
and has been successfully rehabilitated, he may
not be denied re-employment simply because of
his past record of drug addiction.
Moreover, even if it were correct that
Bockmiller was not aware of Hernandez's
record of drug addiction at the time she rejected
his application, Hughes's decision not to re-
employ him because of his prior "termination"
would violate the ADA. If Bockmiller in fact
did not know the reasons for Hernandez's
"termination," her lack of knowledge would
have been due solely to Hughes's unlawful
policy which shields its employees from the
knowledge that an employment decision may be
illegal. Maintaining a blanket policy against
rehire of all former employees who violated
company policy not only screens out persons
with a record of addiction who have been
successfully rehabilitated, but may well result,
as Hughes contends it did here, in the staff
member who makes the employment decision
remaining unaware of the "disability" and thus
of the fact that she is committing an unlawful
act. Having willfully induced ignorance on the
part of its employees who make hiring
decisions, an employer may not avoid
responsibility for its violation of the ADA by
seeking to rely on that lack of knowledge.1
Accordingly, Hughes's unwritten policy is not a
"legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its
rejection of Hernandez's application.18 Burdine,
450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
In sum, we hold that Hernandez has made a
prima facie case of discrimination on the basis
of a disability. He has presented sufficient
evidence from which a jury could conclude that
he was "qualified" for the position he sought in
1994 and that his application was rejected
because of his record of drug addiction.
Additionally, we hold that a policy that serves to
bar the re- employment of a drug addict despite
17 There is no question that Hughes applied this policy in
rejecting Hernandez's application. It has repeatedly
emphasized and argued that the rejection was based solely
on its policy not to rehire those who previously violated
company rules.
18 It also follows that Hernandez has established a prima
facie case that the cause for the rejection of his
application was his prior record of addiction, whether the
individual who made the decision to reject was aware of
the specific reason for his prior termination or whether
she failed to examine the file as a result of Hughes's
unlawful blanket policy. See supra discussion at p. 1034.
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his successful rehabilitation violates the ADA.
Therefore, Hughes's unwritten policy that it will
not rehire employees who left the company due
to violations of personal conduct rules violates
the ADA, as applied to employees with the
disability of drug addiction whose only work-
related offense was testing positive for drug use
but are now rehabilitated.19
Accordingly, summary judgment was
20improper. We reverse and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
19 We note that Hughes has not raised a business necessity
defense, see 42 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and we do not consider
when, if ever, such a defense might be available with
respect to the hiring of a rehabilitated drug addict.
20 We affirm, however, the district court's ruling that
Hernandez failed to timely raise his claim of disparate
impact. This claim is not pled in the complaint nor did
Hernandez raise it prior to the close of discovery. See
Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th
Cir.2000). Accordingly, we grant Hughes's motion to
strike the portions of Hernandez's Reply Brief that discuss
his disparate impact claim.
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Justices to Test Refusal to Hire Over Drug Use
Los Angeles Times
February 25, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court agreed
Monday to decide whether companies can
refuse to hire onetime drug users or alcoholics.
Last year, the federal appeals court in
California ruled that recovered drug users can
be seen as having a disability and are thus
protected from discrimination under federal law.
The decision by the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals cleared the way for a former technician
for Hughes Missile Systems in Tucson to sue his
ex-employer for refusing to rehire him.
Joel Hernandez had worked at the plant for 25
years when he quit in 1991 because of cocaine
use. After going through a recovery program, he
reapplied for his former job in 1994 but was
rejected.
"He is a born-again Christian and hasn't had
any involvement with drugs or alcohol," said his
lawyer, Stephen Montoya.
But lawyers for Hughes said the company had
a policy of not rehiring workers who left
because of misconduct, including drug use.
They urged the high court to take up the issue
and to rule that the law does not create a right to
a "second chance."
"The Americans With Disabilities Act
promises nondiscrimination; it does not promise
to insulate drug users from the consequences of
their misconduct," said Los Angeles lawyer Paul
Grossman, representing Hughes.
The company is now part of Raytheon. Unless
reversed, the 9th Circuit's decision would confer
"preferential rights" on former drug users,
Grossman said.
The case of Raytheon Co. vs. Hernandez, 02-
749, to be heard in the fall, will mark the first
ruling from the high court on the status of drug
users and alcoholics under the 1990 law.
If the court says they fall under the category of
"disabled," the ruling would give them a right to
be hired or rehired without regard to past
behavior.
However, if the court says that company work
rules take precedence, employers will be free to
exclude applicants with a history of alcohol or
drug abuse.
The 1990 law itself reads as something of a
compromise. In the section on "Illegal use of
drugs and alcohol," it says "any employee or
applicant who is currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs" cannot claim to be disabled.
However, it also says that "an individual who
has successfully completed a supervised drug
rehabilitation program and is no longer
engaging in the illegal use of drugs" may be
considered as having a disability.
Georgetown University law professor Chai
Feldblum, who helped draft the law, said it was
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intended to create a distinction between current
and former abusers.
"It says current users are excluded completely.
But it also says you can't discriminate against
someone who had used drugs in the past,"
Feldblum said. "That fact [past drug use] can't
be used against him as the only reason for not
hiring him," she said of Hernandez's case.
The law treats alcoholics in the same manner
as drug users.
The Raytheon case also replays the familiar
liberal versus conservative clash between the
9th Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of Los Angeles, a
liberal leader of the 9th Circuit, wrote the
opinion that revived Hernandez's suit.
Hernandez was qualified for his job, Reinhardt
said. "We hold that a policy that serves to bar
the reemployment of a drug addict despite
successful rehabilitation violates the ADA," he
wrote for a three-judge panel.
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Courts Debate Rehiring Substance Abusers
Workforce
May 1, 2003
Gillian Flynn
Can your company refuse to rehire former
alcohol and substance abusers after they've been
terminated? The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed
to hear a case that may determine just that. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last year
that recovered addicts can be considered
disabled under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, and therefore be protected against
discrimination, prohibiting employers from
using their past substance abuse as a reason not
to hire. The Supreme Court will decide whether
the ruling stands or is overturned. Peter Susser,
a partner in the Washington, D.C., office of
Littler Mendelson, discusses the details and
possible impact of Raytheon Company v.
Hernandez.
What are the case basics?
Joel Hernandez worked for Hughes Missile
Systems [now part of Raytheon] for about 25
years, starting in 1966. In 1991, he was showing
signs of substance abuse, tested positive for
cocaine use, and was given the option of
quitting or being terminated. He quit. He went
through rehabilitation and asked to be rehired in
1994.
What did the company say?
The company had and still has a policy against
rehiring former employees who were terminated
for any violation of misconduct rules, and the
drug and alcohol rules are among the
misconduct rules. So when Hernandez reapplied
for a job with Hughes, the company's labor
relations department realized he'd previously
been terminated for misconduct, and rejected
the application. He filed a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, and the case was
brought to court under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. He really wasn't challenging
the fact that he was terminated back in 1991, but
rather he was focusing on the fact that at the
time he reapplied in 1994, he had what he called
a "record of impairment"-and that the company
regarded him as having an impairment. He also
argued that his past drug use was relative to a
past addiction from which he'd been
rehabilitated.
How was this argument received?
The district court rejected all these arguments
by Hernandez, and granted summary judgment
to the company. But the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The court acknowledged that when Hernandez
was terminated back in 1991, he wasn't a person
with a disability, because the language of the
ADA specifically excludes current drug users
from ADA coverage. But he had a record of a
disability [at the company], so when he
reapplied after rehabilitation, no longer using
drugs, he was entitled to the act's protection. So
the Ninth Circuit reversed and said the
company's policy was unlawful.
What does Raytheon's case, to be presented to
the Supreme Court, argue?
They argue that the Ninth Circuit's opinion
essentially creates preferential treatment for
people who are fired for drug-related
misconduct. The company has a policy to not
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only fire but also refuse to rehire employees
who are terminated for other forms of
misconduct, like theft. So the company argues
that folks fired for alcohol or drug use get a
special second chance here.
So the Ninth Circuit's opinion basically says that
once you've recovered from an addiction, you
can be seen as having a disability?
Right. Because the language of the law right
now is that a current drug user is excluded from
the definition of individuals with protected
disabilities. But once a person has gone through
rehabilitation successfully, that exclusion no
longer applies. At that point, they might fit one
of the [definitions] of an individual with a
disability which is having a record of an
impairment or being regarded as having an
impairment.
What's the exact definition of a disability under
the ADA?
Very broadly, it means a person has a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities; or has a record
of that kind of impairment; or is regarded as
having that kind of impairment. The law
specifically says that the term "qualified
individual with a disability" does not include
any employee or applicant who's currently
engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
So the ADA doesn't protect a current drug user?
You can have a drug-testing policy and prohibit
employees from using illegal drugs-the ADA
has no problem with that. You can certainly
prohibit employees from using drugs and
alcohol at work or from coming to work under
the influence. So if you have a policy
prohibiting employees from possessing illegal
drugs on the premises and you find an employee
who does, even if he says he has an addiction
problem, that doesn't give him any insulation
from rules prohibiting possession on the
premises.
Under the Ninth Circuit's ruling, could the
employee return after treatment and ask to be
rehired?
Yes, the argument would be: I've gone through
rehabilitation and I've come back. If you
exclude me solely by virtue of the conduct due
to my prior disability, you're acting on the basis
of my record, and I'm protected on that basis at
this stage of the game.
Even if HR didn't know that the employee had a
substance-abuse
problem?
Right. The employer may not have known that
the employee's low productivity or absences
were related to drinking or drugs. Five years
later, after going through rehab, the former
employee reapplies and says, "I know I had an
absenteeism problem, but that was due to my
past [use]," That would be sufficient even
though there wouldn't be a piece of paper in the
employee's file necessarily.
Right now, as the ADA stands, if an employee
comes to HR and says he or she has an alcohol
problem, what should HR do?
People who abuse alcohol can be considered
disabled under the ADA, [if they] show their
alcoholism substantially limits their ability to
perform major life activities. But if a current
employee is experiencing lots of absences, way
past the company standards, and the company
decides to discipline or terminate her because of
it, the employee can't say: "You can't do that,
I'm an alcoholic." The employer can enforce
standards relating to productivity and work
rules.
Once an employee completes treatment, how
should HR address the situation?
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If somebody has been allowed to take leave,
they've self-identified and been through
rehabilitation, they're probably in a stronger
position [to keep their job] after the
rehabilitation than before. But if they've been
terminated prior to rehab or their admission that
there's a problem, they're not automatically
entitled to get their job back by any means.
That's what's at issue in this case: What is the
status of employees who've undergone
successful rehabilitation but have been
terminated? Are they entitled to get their jobs
back? Essentially, the Ninth Circuit is giving
them a second chance and putting them in a
preferential position, whereas Raytheon is
saying: "No, we don't want to rehire people who
have violated our work rules for whatever
reason, and the law should not require it."
How should employers covered by the Ninth
Circuit [which includes all federal courts in
California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona,
Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Alaska, and Hawaii]
proceed as we wait for the Supreme Court to
hear the case?
The Ninth Circuit, which tends to be one of the
most liberal appellate courts in the country, has
been reversed very frequently in employment
cases in the last several years. And there's some
reason to think this might be reversed as well.
But it's a gamble because the court could back
up the Ninth Circuit, which would give a very
viable action to somebody you would say no to
[rehiring] today-someone who had a past
alcohol or drug problem but also a record of
rehabilitation. The Ninth Circuit decision would
give those folks a fairly strong case against you
for disability discrimination, and the failure to
hire could trigger back pay, compensatory and
punitive damages. and attorneys' fees.
How should employers not covered by the Ninth
Circuit proceed?
The problem comes about with someone no
longer in your employ who is coming with a
[request to be rehired] and may have a record of
an impairment. I think most courts would agree
that it would be reasonable to use six months or
a year as a period for which you'd exclude a
former user. So did this person have this
addiction problem six months ago or 10 years
ago? Say you fire somebody because of a
positive drug test, they go through rehab, then
come back two months later and say they're
clean. There's a legal question as to whether
they still could be looked at as a current user
and excluded lawfullyversus the person who's
been [sober] 10 years. A second thing to
consider is the type of job involved. If it's a
safety-sensitive job, other legal defenses may
come into play. An employer has a good
defense for excluding an individual who may
impose a direct threat to the health and safety of
others or himself-a school-bus driver or
someone at the controls of a nuclear plant.
Those are two good ways to evaluate the
situations that may come up in the interim.
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Justices Hear Case on Company Policy on Employees Disabled due to Drugs
Drug Detection Report
March 20, 2003
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide on
whether a company is obligated to rehire
employees who were fired for substance abuse
but who have since been rehabilitated.
In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, No. 02-749,
25-year company veteran Joel Hernandez sued
his former employer, Hughes Missile Systems,
under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), saying that the company refused to
rehire him after a two-year hiatus because he
had a history of drug addiction.
The company took this action even though
Hernandez had successfully completed a
rehabilitation program. (Hughes was recently
acquired by the Raytheon Company, which is
now appealing the decision.)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit
sided with Hernandez by rejecting Hughes'
motion for summary judgment.
Company Policy Is Real Issue
The appeals court noted that Hernandez'
disability, his drug addiction, was never in
dispute. What was at issue was company policy
that led to his termination. And Hernandez'
departure was technically a resignation.
When he tested positive for drugs in 1991,
Hughes officials gave him the option of
resigning. Then when he attempted to reapply in
early 1994, a personnel officer looked up his old
file, saw the "resignation in lieu of termination,"
and rejected the application.
Hughes' policy is likely to become one of the
key issues when the high court considers the
case later this year, disability attorney Peter
Blanck said. The central question is whether
such a "blanket policy" that excludes a subgroup
of people, like those with a certain disability,
violates ADA.
Although the appeals court said it did, Blanck
told DDR he is not sure the Supreme Court will
take the same tack. If it does address these
policies, the final ruling likely will include a lot
of leeway for employers.
Blanck is the director of the Law Health Policy
and Disability Center at the University of Iowa
and was the plaintiffs' attorney in another recent
ADA case before the high court, Chevron v.
Echazabal, No. 00-1406.
When it Is Established as a 'Disability'
Another issue likely to turn up during
deliberations is whether ADA grants referential
treatment to certain groups, which has been an
issue in other ADA cases before the court,
Blanck explained. One or more of the justices
may wonder why someone with a record of
substance abuse should be protected by the law,
but not someone who simply comes in to work
drunk one time.
The appeals court addressed a similar issue,
but from a different angle. In looking
specifically at Hughes, it noted how company
policy places a long-time employee like
Hernandez, who was fired and then
rehabilitated, at a disadvantage, compared to a
104
first-time applicant with a new drug problem.
An employee like Hernandez is forever barred
from further employment with the company.
But new job applicants who have a positive drug
test are only ineligible for work for 12 months.
The court's Raytheon ruling may also affect
how often substance abusers are able to qualify
under ADA, Blanck said. In another recent
ADA case, Toyota v. Williams, No. 00-1089,
the court said that a doctor's report confirming a
condition's existence is not good enough; that
condition must also cause "substantial
limitations" in the person's functioning.
Additionally, the court may say something
about who has the burden of proof, the
complainant or the employer.
Contact Peter Blanck, director, Law Health
Policy and Disability Center, (319) 335-9043,
www.its.uiowa.edu/law. The 9th Circuit ruling
in the case then-known as Hernandez v. Hughes
Missile Systems Company, No. 01-15512, from
June 11, 2002, can be found online at
www.ce9.uscourts.gov.
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02-1080 General Dynamics Land Systems Inc. v. Cline
Ruling Below: (6th Cir., 296 F.3d 466, 71 U.S.L.W. 1071, 89 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 609)
Allegation that employee benefit plan amendment restricting benefits to employees currently
over age 50 adversely affects employees who are between ages 40 and 49 states claim of
discrimination "against any individual with respect to ... terms ... of employment, because of
such individual's age" within meaning of Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Question Presented: Did Sixth Circuit err in holding, contrary to decisions of First and Seventh
Circuits, that ADEA prohibits "reverse discrimination," i.e., employer actions, practices, or
policies that treat older workers more favorably than younger workers who are at least 40 years
old?
Dennis CLINE, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
GENERAL DYNAMICS LAND SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Sixth Circuit.
Decided and Filed: July 22, 2002.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied: September 19, 2002.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
RYAN, Circuit Judge.
We must decide whether the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. § 621-634, which prohibits an
employer from discriminating against any
employee age 40 and over on the basis of age,
provides a cause of action for employees within
the protected class who claim that their
employer discriminated against them on the
basis of age because of the employer's more
favorable treatment of older employees, also
within the class. We hold that on the facts of
this case the ADEA
does provide the plaintiffs a cause of action,
and that they have made out an actionable
claim.
We rest our holding on familiar canons of
statutory construction too elementary to require
a citation, which direct courts to apply statutes
consistent with their plain language; that is, by
assigning to the words of the statute their
primary and generally understood meaning.
We conclude that in dismissing the plaintiffs'
complaint, the district court opinion departs
from this familiar maxim, and therefore, we
reverse the district court's judgment and remand
for further proceedings.
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I.
Dennis Cline, as named representative for the
putative class, and 195 other employees of
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., brought
suit against their employer after their labor
union, the United Auto Workers, and General
Dynamics entered into a new collective
bargaining agreement (CBA2). The agreement
took effect July 1, 1997. Before that date, the
parties had been bound by a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA1) that obligated
General Dynamics to provide full health
benefits to retired workers who had accumulated
30 years of seniority. With one exception, the
new agreement no longer required General
Dynamics to provide full health benefits to
retirees. That exception held that only
employees 50 years of age or older on July 1,
1997, remained eligible to receive full health
benefits upon retirement. As a result, the
plaintiffs sought, and obtained, a determination
from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission that the CBA2 adversely affected
General Dynamics employees who were
between the ages of 40 and 49 on July 1, 1997.
Cline and his fellow employees then filed suit
under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621-634, and the
Ohio Civil Rights Act, Ohio Rev.Code §
4112.99. They alleged that the provision of
health benefits solely to those over the age of 50
constituted illegal discrimination based on age.
Each of the plaintiffs was between the ages of
40 and 49 on July 1, 1997, and thus a member
of the ADEA's protected class. For purposes of
the lawsuit, the plaintiffs self-divided into three
groups. The so-called "Cline group" is
composed of 183 current General Dynamics
employees who are no longer eligible for full
health benefits upon retirement. The "Babb
group" consists of 10 employees who retired
prior to July 1, 1997, in order to receive full
health benefits. Finally, the "Diaz group"
includes three employees who retired after July
1, 1997, and are ineligible for health benefits.
In addition to their age discrimination claims,
the plaintiffs also sought "declaratory
judgment," but in their complaint they made no
reference to the Declaratory Judgment Act; they
simply requested that the district court
determine whether the Cline group had standing
to sue and whether their claims were ripe. If
the court determined that the Cline group did
not have either standing and/or ripe claims, the
plaintiffs then requested that the district court
determine when they would have standing and
ripe claims.
Upon the defendant's motion, the district court
dismissed the plaintiffs' suit pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). At the outset of its
memorandum opinion, the district court noted
that the ADEA and the Ohio Civil Rights Act
would be interpreted together and receive
identical legal analyses. The district court
characterized the plaintiffs' argument as a claim
that they were wrongfully denied existing job
benefits on the basis of age. The court held that
under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(1), (2)(A), General Dynamics's provision
of health benefits upon retirement was part of a
"welfare benefit plan," which the company was
not obligated to provide. The court concluded
that it would have been permissible to withhold
retiree health benefits from all employees under
the CBA2. While the district court admitted that
the CBA2 "facially discriminates" by creating
two classes of employees based solely on age, it
ultimately concluded that the ADEA does not
recognize claims for "reverse discrimination."
The court reasoned that the ADEA was drafted
to aid "older workers," not those who suffer age
discrimination because they are too young. The
district court did not specifically address Cline's
request for declaratory relief
II.
We review de novo a district court's grant of a
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motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6). Lawrence v. Chancery Court of Tenn.,
188 F.3d 687, 691 (6th Cir.1999).
The starting point in determining how a statute
is to be applied is the language of the statute
itself. Consumer Prod Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., ... This court has said that "[t]he
primary rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislative
intent." Hedgepeth v. Tenn., 215 F.3d 608, 616
(6th Cir.2000). Legislative intent, however, is
gleaned primarily from the statute's plain
language, and where the statute's language is
plain and unambiguous, there is no justification
for resorting to legislative history to ascertain
the lawmaker's intent-the words of the statute
suffice. In re Comshare Inc. Sec. Litig., 183
F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.1999). The Supreme
Court has recognized that "statutory provisions
often go beyond the principal evil to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately
the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed." Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79, 118 S.Ct.
998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Moreover, if a
court thinks statutory language does not reflect
what the court believes the legislators "must
have" intended, the court may not, under the
guise of "statutory interpretation," rectify the
problem by holding, in effect, that the
legislators intended something other than what
they declared. " 'It is not the Court's role to
address perceived inadequacies in [a statute].' "
In re Aberl, 78 F.3d 241, 244 (6th Cir.1996)
(quoting Wolf Creek Collieries v. Robinson, 872
F.2d 1264, 1269 (6th Cir.1989)) (alteration in
original). Thus, courts must apply a statute as
its language directs, not in accordance with a
judicial supposition as to what the legislature
might better have written. The application of
these simple and settled canons easily
determines the proper resolution of this case.
Section 623(a)(1) of the ADEA reads:
It shall be unlawful for an employer--
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's
age.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). This
language clearly and unambiguously forbids
employers from defining the terms and benefits
of "any individual['s]" employment based solely
on his or her age. In § 631(a), Congress
declared that "any individual" means those
"individuals who are at least 40 years of age."
29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Thus, by the law's plain
language, an employer may not discriminate
against any worker age 40 or older on the basis
of age. Those younger than 40 are not protected
by the ADEA. O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312, 116 S.Ct.
1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996).
To reach the conclusion for which the
defendant argues, and that was found persuasive
by the district court, we would be required to
hold that the plain language of § 623(a)(1) and
§ 631(a) does not mean what it says when it
refers to "any individual," but means, instead,
"older workers." Thus, only "older workers,"
meaning those individuals who are at least 40
years of age and, in addition, relatively older
than any other group of employees with whom
they are compared, are protected. This
interpretive reading of the statute led the district
court to conclude that the ADEA does not
prohibit an employer from discriminating, on
the basis of age, against "any individual" who is
a member of the ADEA's protected class, but
only prohibits discrimination against those in
the protected class who are "older" than the
favored employees. We think the plain
meaning of the statute will not bear that reading.
In support of its holding, the district court cited
to Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226,
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1228 (7th Cir.1992), for the proposition that the
ADEA does not recognize claims of reverse age
discrimination. We recognize that Hamilton
and the majority of courts to consider the
question before us have held that the ADEA
does not provide a cause of action for "reverse
discrimination." See, e.g., Schuler v. Polaroid
Corp., 848 F.2d 276, 278 (1st Cir.1988)
(Breyer, J.); .... For a variety of reasons,
however, we do not find the reasoning
undergirding these opinions persuasive.
We find that the Hamilton opinion fails to
properly interpret the ADEA. First, it assigns far
too much weight to the hortatory, generalized
language of Congress's Statement of Findings
and Purpose in the ADEA. Second, it ignores,
indeed it reverses, the familiar rule that the more
direct and specific language of a statute
ordinarily trumps the more generalized. Metro.
Detroit Area Hosp. Servs., Inc. v. United States,
634 F.2d 330, 334 (6th Cir.1980).
Turning to the Statement of Findings and
Purpose:
(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares
that-
(1) in the face of rising productivity and
affluence, older workers find themselves
disadvantaged in their efforts to retain
employment, and especially to regain
employment when displaced from jobs[.]
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to
promote employment of older persons based
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to
help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment.
29 U.S.C. § 621(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
Notably, neither § 621, nor any other section of
the statute, provides a definition of "older
workers" or "older persons." Nonetheless,
because statutory language should be given its
plain meaning absent evidence to the contrary,
we agree that Congress intended to protect older
workers. But to hold that the ADEA protects
older workers from employers' age
discrimination provides no answer to the
question this litigation presents. The question
here is whether any worker over the age of 40
("any individual") may be discriminated against
on the basis of age. To hold, as the ADEA
requires us to hold, that employment age
discrimination against any worker at least 40
years of age is prohibited, does nothing to defeat
the congressional intent to protect "older
workers" and "older persons."
To repeat: § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a), taken
together, prohibit an employer from
discriminating against "any individual" 40 years
of age or older based on that person's age.
"'When we can discern an unambiguous and
plain meaning from the language of a statute,
our task is at an end.' " Henry Ford Health Sys.
v. Shalala, 233 F.3d 907, 910 (6th Cir.2000)
(quoting Bartlik v. US. Dep't of Labor, 62 F.3d
163, 166 (6th Cir.1995)).
Our holding does not change even if one
concludes--and we do not--that the hortatory
language of § 621 is inconsistent with the plain
meaning of § 623(a)(1) and § 63 1(a). When
two different parts of a statute appear to
conflict, the court should, if possible, give these
parts a "harmonious, comprehensive meaning."
United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co. .... The
exhortation in § 621 to protect "older workers"
and "older persons" is easily reconciled with the
specific provisions of § 623 and § 631, which
prohibit age discrimination against "any
individual" age 40 or older. Courts must
interpret statutes " 'as a whole, giving effect to
each word and making every effort not to
interpret a provision in a manner that renders
other provisions of the same statute inconsistent,
meaningless or superfluous.' " Cafarelli v.
Yancy, 226 F.3d 492, 499 (6th Cir.2000)
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(citation omitted). In § 621, Congress declared
its intention to protect older workers, and in §
623 and § 631, it identified the older workers it
intends to protect as "any individual" age 40 or
older. Thus, the several relevant sections of the
statute are easily reconciled.
Moreover, we do not share the commonly held
belief that this situation is one of so-called
"reverse discrimination." Insofar as we are able
to determine, the expression "reverse
discrimination" has no ascertainable meaning in
the law. An action is either discriminatory or it
is not discriminatory, and some discriminatory
actions are prohibited by law. Presumably,
what the district judge and others mean when
they conclude that the ADEA does not prohibit
"reverse discrimination" is that otherwise
prohibited discrimination is permitted if the
victims are literally (statutorily) within the
protected class, but are a group within the class
who in most cases are the beneficiaries of
discrimination against others. There is no basis
for this conclusion. We are not aware of any
legal doctrine permitting courts to redraft anti-
discrimination statutes so that they better
advance the court's view of sound policy.
Furthermore, even if we granted the district
court its definition of "reverse discrimination,"
it is clear that Cline and his classmates did not
suffer "reverse age discrimination." By the plain
language of the ADEA they are the victims of
"age discrimination." Congress has singled out
the over 40 class of workers from the general
workforce for protection from age
discrimination by their employers. All the
plaintiffs are members of the protected class
created by § 631(a), and all properly allege that
they were denied job benefits due to their age.
Therefore, the protected class should be
protected; to hold otherwise is discrimination,
plain and simple.
Finally, we note that those courts adopting the
Hamilton holding do so in contravention of the
EEOC. The EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA
"is significant because an agency's interpretation
of an ambiguous provision within the statute it
is authorized to implement is entitled to judicial
deference." Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611,
619 (6th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks,
citation, and alterations omitted). In its review
of the matter at hand, the agency notes:
It is unlawful ... for an employer to
discriminate in hiring or in any other way by
giving preference because of age between
individuals 40 and over. Thus, if two people
apply for the same position, and one is 42 and
the other 52, the employer may not lawfully
turn down either one on the basis of age, but
must make such decision on the basis of some
other factor.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (emphasis added).
While a court can certainly interpret a statute
and properly reach a different conclusion from a
federal agency, we are persuaded that the
EEOC's interpretation of the ADEA is a true
rendering of the language.
III.
There is no doubt that the facts of this case are
unusual and fall outside the typical ADEA
claim, in that the plaintiffs were younger than
the employees who were to receive health
benefits upon retirement under the CBA2. But
the fact that some members within the protected
class were beneficiaries of the discriminatory
action of which other members of the protected
class--the plaintiffs--were victims, does not
somehow suspend the language of the statute,
which prohibits age discrimination against "any
individual" within the protected class. As we
stated earlier, when the language of a statute is
unambiguous we have no basis for seeking a
statute's meaning in its legislative history or
intent. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183
F.3d at 549. The syllogism goes like this: The
ADEA expressly prohibits denying any
employee within the protected class an
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employment benefit solely because of age. The
CBA2 provision in question denies a group of
employees within the protected class an
employee benefit based solely on their age.
Therefore, the ADEA prohibits the CBA2
provision in question.
If Congress wanted to limit the ADEA to
protect only those workers who are relatively
older, it clearly had the power and acuity to do
so. It did not. Whatever the policy
justifications for holding otherwise, we are
bound by the plain language of the statute and
have no occasion to look outside of the text.
IV.
We express no opinion whether the plaintiffs
have made out an actionable claim under the
Ohio Civil Rights Act because we think the
district court should be given the opportunity to
consider that question in light of what we have
decided today with respect to the ADEA.
V.
Because Cline and the other plaintiffs were
each within the ADEA's protected class when
their employer allegedly discriminated against
them on the basis of age, we REVERSE the
district court's grant of the motion to dismiss.
On remand, the district court should address the
plaintiffs' declaratory judgment argument
concerning standing and ripeness, which was
not considered by the district court and thus is
not properly before us for review.
[COLE, Circuit Judge, concurring opinion
omitted; WILLIAMS, District Judge, dissenting
opinion omitted]
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Supreme Court to Hear Reverse Age Bias Case
Los Angeles Times
April 22, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. Supreme Court
agreed Monday to decide whether middle- aged
employees can sue employers who adopt pay or
benefit plans that favor older workers.
The case, to be heard in the fall, is the first
claim of "reverse discrimination" in the area of
age bias to reach the high court.
The outcome could rewrite the rules for
pensions and health-care plans.
If the court says companies must follow
exactly the same rules for all employees,
employers could no longer offer special
incentives to encourage older workers to retire,
business lawyers said.
"This basically calls into question what
employers have been doing," said Ann
Reesman, a Washington attorney who filed a
friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the National Assn.
of Manufacturers.
The groups urged the court to reject reverse
discrimination claims by younger workers. They
argue that the federal law against age bias was
intended to protect older workers from
discrimination.
"This would turn the law on its head,"
Reesman said.
But lawyers for the younger workers point out
that the age bias law protects people who are
over age 40.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
or ADEA, of 1967 makes it illegal for
employers to "discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual's age."
A pension or benefit plan that favors 60-year-
olds over 40-year-olds is illegal because it
discriminates against some individuals based on
their age, advocates say.
The case arose when a division of General
Dynamics Corp. moved to change its policy on
providing health care for retired employees.
Before 1997, workers with more than 30 years
of service could retire with full health benefits.
But after 1997, only those employees who were
at least 50 years old in 1997 could look forward
to this benefit.
Those who were younger than 50 were not
entitled to health benefits when they retired.
Dennis Cline and a group of workers who were
between 40 and 49 sued for age discrimination.
Last year, they won a key ruling in the U.S. 6th
Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati. In a 2-1
decision, the appeals court said the law forbids
all age bias against protected workers, whether
they are 40 or 65.
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The court will rule on the case of General
The General Dynamics plan discriminates by Dynamics vs. Cline early next year.
creating two classes of employees based solely
on age, the court said.
But lawyers for the military contractor
appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that
reverse discrimination claims are outside the
law.
They noted that no other court has upheld
reverse bias claims in this area.
The lower court's "counterintuitive conclusion
that the ADEA permits younger employees to
challenge the beneficial treatment of older
workers is nothing short of absurd," argued
Washington attorney William J. Kilberg,
representing General Dynamics.
"In times of economic uncertainty, employers
are faced with the need to scale back previously
generous benefits programs. In many cases, the
choice they face is between offering a
retirement benefit only to some employees, or
offering it to none."
If the middle-aged workers win their claim,
employers might opt to cancel benefits for all,
Kilberg suggested.
"Perversely, those most injured by this
interpretation will be the very group of older
workers whose employment opportunities
Congress sought to enhance by adopting the
ADEA," Kilberg said.
General Dynamics Land Systems makes tanks
and other military vehicles at its plants in Lima,
Ohio, and Scranton, Pa.
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Commentary: Courts ponder whether young can benefit from ADEA.
Minnesota Lawyer
May 26, 2003
Byline: Marshall Tanick
The federal and state laws prohibiting age
discrimination in employment were
originally targeted at actions by employers
reflecting bias against older employees. But
similar to many other antidiscrimination
laws, they have morphed into new shapes,
perhaps not fully anticipated by their
architects.
For instance, the laws against sexual
harassment, originally aimed at protecting
women from improprieties by men, have
been applied to "same sex" harassment as
well as "reverse" discrimination by women
against men. E.g., Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. (1998)
and Cummings v. Kohnen, 568 N.W.2d 418
(Minn. 1997)("same sex" harassment);
Couch v. Sprint Corp., 131 F.3d 764 (8th
Cir. 1997)(reverse gender and race
discrimination).
The disability discrimination laws have
been applied to persons who are not disabled
at all. See Cosette v. Minnesota Power &
Light Co., 188 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 1999)
(confidential medical data protected for
(nondisabled persons); Miners v. Cargill
Communications, Inc., 113 F.2d. 820 (8th
Cir. 1997), (cert. denied) 118 S.Ct. 441
(1997) (perception of disability proscribed.)
The age discrimination laws may be the
next ones to be deployed in a manner that
may not have been fully contemplated by
their drafters. The U.S. Supreme Court
recently agreed to decide whether the federal
law proscribing bias against older
employees, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Sec.
621, et seq., protects employees who are
subject to differential treatment because of
their youth.
The issue of "reverse discrimination" has
been sparingly addressed by the federal and
state tribunals, including Minnesota. But the
topic of age discrimination against younger
people is particularly timely in light of the
advances youth are making in the business
world, including law. Ten of them were
honored last week as "up and coming"
attorneys at Minnesota Lawyer's annual
awards dinner.
'Reverse'ruling
The nation's high court will consider a
decision by the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals that upheld a "reverse"
discrimination age bias claim in General
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline.
The case stems from a provision in a
collective bargaining agreement that
terminated health benefits for retired
workers, except for those who had turned 50
years old by July 1, 1997.
A group of employees between the ages of
40 and 50 brought an age discrimination
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lawsuit under the ADEA, alleging that the
cutoff illegally favors older employees, a
proposition adopted by the 6th Circuit. 296
F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
The circuit court recognized that the "facts
of this case are unusual and fall outside the
typical" age discrimination case because it
was asserted by those at the youngest levels
against action favoring relatively older
workers. But the court deemed the claim
actionable under the "plain language of the
statute," which bars disparate treatment of
anyone 40 or older.
The high court accepted review and will
determine in its upcoming term whether the
ADEA, which expressly protects employees
40 or older, applies to "reverse"
discrimination claims by 40-something
workers.
State syndromes
But the Cline case, which addresses the
rights of workers over the age of 40,
indirectly raises an even more provocative
issue: do age discrimination laws protect
younger employees who assert they were
subject to disparate treatment in favor of
their elders because of their youth?
The parallel protection of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act (MHRA) barring
discrimination against the aged in
employment, Minn. Stat. sec. 363.01, et.
seq., does not have a specific age threshold.
Unlike the 40-year-old standard under the
ADEA, the MHRA is silent on its standard.
Therefore, the law could be construed on
its face, to cover discrimination against the
elderly as well as against younger
employees. While there is a paucity of
Minnesota caselaw that substantiates this
position, other states are witnessing the
construction of their state laws as
prohibiting discrimination against younger
employees. E.g. Bergen Commercial Bank
v. Sister, 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999); Ogden
v. Bureau of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 192 (Or.
1985); Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Servs.
Corp., 612 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2000); Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870
F.Supp. 389, 405, n.27 (D. Me. 1994).
In another twist, an appellate court in
Massachusetts recently allowed an attorney
to strike jurors due to their youth.
In Gates v. Flood, 785 N.E.2d 1289 (Mass.
2003), a public sector employee who was
forced to retire at age 65 sought to
preemptorily remove two young prospective
jurors in his wrongful discharge case. The
trial court judge did not let him do so, ruling
that age-based challenges constituted illegal
age discrimination.
But the appeals court reversed, holding that
age can be a permissible basis to strike a
potential juror. Such preemptory challenges,
while based on prohibited categories such as
sex or race, may be "exercised without a
reason stated as to inquiry and without being
subject to the [trial] court's control."
Statistics show
Statistics show that age discrimination
charges constitute more than one-fifth of the
claims filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the
agency that oversees federal bias laws.
During the most recently reported period,
the number of claims rose nationally by 9
percent, from 16,888 to 17,405 -- although
for some inexplicable reason, the number of
age bias charges filed with the EEOC in
Minnesota dropped by 20 percent, from 169
to 136. Age discrimination claims with the
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Minnesota Department of Human Rights
surged, however, going from 235 to 289 in
one year, a 23 percent increase.
Age discrimination claims are increasing,
primarily because of the aging work force,
the general increase in joblessness and other
factors. (See "Corporate culture and
culpability for ageism," in the Jan. 14, 2002,
edition of Minnesota Lawyer.)
But the bondage of bias also affects
younger employees. It could become an
even more prevalent problem as the ranks of
aging workers swell, resulting in political
pressures and other factors that tilt the
management-labor arrangements and the
laws more favorably toward older
employees, rather than against them.
Minnesota courts construing the state
human rights act generally follow federal
precedents. E.g. Sigurdson v. Isanti County,
386 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. 1986). Therefore,
the prospective ruling by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Cline may go a long way to
determining whether younger employees in
Minnesota, even those who haven't reached
the age 40 federal threshold, will break free
from the illusion, or reality, of
discrimination due to their tender years.
Marshall H. Tanick is an attorney with the
Twin Cities law firm of Mansfield, Tanick
& Cohen, P.A. He is certified as a civil trial
specialist by the Minnesota State Bar
Association and represents employers and
employees in a variety of workplace-related
matters.
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ADEA--REVERSE DISCRIMINATION SUITS--SIXTH CIRCUIT PERMITS REVERSE
AGE ISCRIMINATION SUIT TO PROCEED.--CLINE V. GENERAL DYNAMICS
LAND SYSTEMS, INC., 296 F.3D 466 (6TH CIR. 2002).
Harvard Law Review
March, 2003
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted]
After passing seminal legislation designed
to combat workplace discrimination against
women and racial minorities, Congress
turned its attention to the problems peculiar
to older workers. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 instructed the Secretary
of Labor to conduct a "full and complete
study of the factors which might tend to
result in discrimination in employment
because of age." Secretary W. Willard
Wirtz's ensuing report distinguished age
from other bases of discrimination. In
acknowledgment of these differences,
Congress ultimately passed the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), seeking to root out discrimination
grounded in stereotypes about the abilities of
older workers. Given the Act's relatively
narrow purpose, workers who bring claims
of "reverse" age discrimination against their
employers typically meet with little
success.6
Recently, however, in Cline v. General
6 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d
1226, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming the
dismissal of the plaintiffs reverse age discrimination
claim on the ground that the ADEA was not intended
to address such claims); Dittman v. Gen. Motors
Corp.--Delco Chassis Div., 941 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D.
Conn. 1996) (dismissing such a claim); Parker v.
Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131, 114041 (D. Me. 1995)
(same).
Dynamics Land Systems, Inc.,7 the Sixth
Circuit departed from the jurisprudence of
other circuits. Relying less on statutory
purpose and more on the supposed dictates
of the ADEA's "plain language," the court
permitted a group of workers aged forty to
forty-nine to maintain a suit alleging that
their employer violated the ADEA by
depriving them of benefits awarded to
employees aged fifty and over. Although it
clothed its opinion in the guise of new
textualism, the court was unfaithful to the
basic tenets of this interpretive method. By
ignoring the portion of the Act that exempts
retirement benefit plans from certain ADEA
strictures and, instead, including these plans
within the ambit of regulable contracts, the
court misapplied new textualism. In so
doing, it rendered an opinion patently at
odds with the text and intent of the ADEA.
On July 1, 1997, the benefits plan at the
center of this dispute took effect. It was
embedded within a new collective
bargaining agreement between General
Dynamics Land Systems and its employees.
This new plan did not obligate General
Dynamics to provide full health benefits to
all of its retirees. Instead, only employees
who were at least fifty years of age on the
effective date were eligible to receive these
benefits. Dennis Cline and 195 other
employees of General Dynamics brought
' 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002).
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suit against their employer, alleging that this
new agreement violated the ADEA and
analogous provisions of state law.13  The
plaintiffs alleged that by conferring benefits
only on those employees who had reached
the age of fifty, General Dynamics had
engaged in age discrimination. The
defendant moved to dismiss the suit, arguing
that the ADEA does not recognize claims of
reverse discrimination.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio agreed with the defendants.
Noting that "every federal court" has "held
that a claim of reverse age discrimination is
not cognizable under [the] ADEA," the
district court dismissed the suit.16 Like other
federal courts, the district court concluded
that the ADEA was intended to protect older
workers. It was not, the court observed,
designed to aid those who suffer
discrimination because they are too young.
In a 2-1 decision, the Sixth Circuit
reversed. Writing for the court, Judge Ryan
rested his holding on that "familiar canon of
statutory construction" requiring courts to
''apply statutes consistent with their plain
language." The court began by noting that §
623(a)(1) of the ADEA makes it unlawful to
discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of that
individual's age. The court read the
provision to include "benefits." It next
turned to § 631(a). This portion of the
statute notes that the protected class of
"individuals" includes those persons at least
forty years of age.22 Judge Ryan concluded
13 Id.; see also Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.99
(Anderson 2001).
16 Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 2d 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
22 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) (2000).
that, when read together, § 623(a)(1) and
631(a) bar an employer from denying
benefits to workers over the age of forty
based upon their age. This mandate holds,
he wrote, irrespective of whether the
disfavored group comprises workers who
are younger than those in the favored group.
The court concluded that to read the phrase
"any individual" as synonymous with
relatively older workers would be to engage
in an untoward "interpretive reading" of the
statute. The court suggested that most
jurisdictions that have engaged in such a
reading were inspired by the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Hamilton v. Caterpillar,
Inc.2 6  The court criticized the Hamilton
opinion, contending that it placed too much
emphasis on the "hortatory" and
"generalized language" contained in
Congress's Statement of Findings and
Purpose. In this section of the Act,
Congress mentions that the ADEA is
intended to aid "older workers." Yet
Congress does not define this term. Given
this, the court saw nothing wrong with
reading this term to mean all workers over
the age of forty. Based on this reading of
the Act, the court concluded its opinion by
challenging the notion that there is even
such a thing as reverse discrimination. The
court buttressed its conclusion by pointing
out that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has interpreted the ADEA in a
manner consistent with the court's reading.
Judge Cole concurred. He expressed
"serious doubts" about whether Congress
truly intended for the ADEA to protect
against reverse age discrimination. Yet he,
like Judge Ryan, deemed the plaintiffs'
claim to be viable: "Congress's choice of
language, whether specifically intended or
26 966 F.2d 1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992).
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not," seemed to permit no other conclusion.
Sections 623(a)(1) and 631(a), Judge Cole
concluded, barred him from looking
"beyond the language of the statute" to the
legislative history where, he suggested,
evidence undermining the court's holding
might be found.
In dissent, Judge Williams criticized the
majority for recognizing a claim that "no
court in the nation" has recognized under the
ADEA. Judge Williams, agreeing with the
Hamilton court, noted that because the
ADEA refers to "older workers" and "older
persons," it is clear that Congress intended
to prohibit employers from discriminating
against the relatively old. Moreover, Judge
Williams argued that the ruling could
undermine negotiated seniority systems,
which are at the heart of most collective
bargaining agreements.
While the issues Judge Williams raised are
worrisome, the most troubling aspect of the
Sixth Circuit's decision is its unsound
analytical foundation. The court based its
holding on the wrong portion of the ADEA.
As such, its application of new textualism,
regardless of the utility of this interpretive
method, is misguided.
The court based much of its decision on the
language contained in § 623(a)(1) of the
ADEA. According to Judge Ryan, this
provision "clearly and unambiguously
forbids employers from defining the terms
and benefits of 'any individual['s]'
employment based solely on his or her age."
Yet on its face, this section does not so
clearly and unambiguously encompass
employee benefits plans. Section 623(a)(1)
does not refer to them at all--it mentions
only compensation and employment terms,
privileges, and conditions. By including
40 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
benefits plans within the ambit of this
provision, the court engaged in an
"interpretive reading of the statute"--perhaps
the ultimate transgression a professed new
textualist can commit. Fortunately for the
court, § 630(1), of which it makes no
mention, was added to the ADEA in 1990.
This provision notes that employee benefits
plans, as a general rule, are included within
the strictures of § 623(a)(1).
Thus, the Sixth Circuit's reading of §
623(a)(1) was vindicated. Nevertheless, its
casual adherence to new textualist precepts
ultimately catches up with it and undermines
its analysis. The ADEA repeatedly refers to
various types of employee benefits plans."
Importantly, many of these plans are exempt
from the prohibitions of § 623(a)(1).
Section 623(l)(1)(A), for example, notes that
it "shall not be a violation" of § 623(a)(1)
for a company to maintain an employee
benefits plan that "provides for the
attainment of a minimum age as a condition
of eligibility for normal or early retirement
benefits." Including within the strictures of
§ 623(a)(1) plans like the one that General
Dynamics put in place makes the exemption
contained in § 623(l)(1)(A) impotent. The
court's inattentiveness to these exemptions
"renders other provisions of the same statute
inconsistent, meaningless, or superfluous."
Such an occurrence is at odds with the new
textualist preference for construing statutes
as a coherent whole.
Plainly, then, the court would have been
more faithful to basic tenets of new
textualism had it grounded its analysis in §
623(l)(1)(A) of the ADEA and,
For instance, the ADEA mentions defined plans,defined contribution plans, employee pension benefit
plans with minimum age requirements, and voluntary
retirement incentive plans. See 29 U.S.C. §
623(i)(1)(A), 623(i)(1)(B), 623(l)(1)(A), 623(m).
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consequently, validated General Dynamics's
retirement benefits plan. Because of its
misapplication of the new textualist method,
the Cline court's decision is of dubious
precedential value. Nonetheless, this
decision is valuable because it exposes,
albeit unintentionally, a significant
limitation of new textualism. Congress did
not intend for reverse age discrimination
claims ever to be cognizable under the
ADEA. However, judicial devotees of new
textualism could fairly embrace such claims
if brought in most non-benefits contexts.
This possibility, presaged by Cline, is quite
ironic, for new textualism aims to deter
judicial lawmaking and preserve
congressional voice.
As an example of new textualism's
potential for judicial lawmaking, consider a
corporation that awarded fifty-year-old
workers not greater retirement benefits, but
greater compensation packages than their
forty-five-year-old coworkers received.
Sections 623(a)(1) and 631(a), as read by a
new textualist such as Judge Ryan, would
permit the younger workers to bring a claim
of reverse age discrimination. Unlike
employee benefits plans, there is no carve-
out, there is no statutory exemption of the
kind that would permit a court faced with
the facts of Cline to dismiss some claims as
outside the reach of the ADEA without
reaching the thorny question whether
reverse age discrimination claims are
cognizable. In a context that lacks such
carve-outs, a new textualist court would
have to ask the hard question whether such
claims are cognizable under the ADEA.
If one argues on new textualists' own
terms, the best way to demonstrate that
reverse age discrimination claims are not
viable is to contend that the word
"discrimination," as used in § 623(a)(1),
lacks a plain meaning. And if one accepts
the term's ambiguity, the statutory history
could be used as a source of elucidation.
New textualists sanction such moves when
terms are unclear. But most new textualists
likely would read the Act as Judge Ryan did,
given that a dictionary would readily support
their broad, more generalized interpretation
of the term "discrimination."
Yet if the statutory history is examined, it
becomes clear that the "discrimination" the
crafters sought to address was of a more
specific type. The aspirations of those who
drafted the ADEA can be deduced through a
consideration of several sources. The
language of § 621(a)-- the Statement of
Findings and Purpose-- should serve as the
starting point. In § 621(a), Congress lists
three aims of the Act: "to promote
employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary
age discrimination in employment; to help
employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of
age on employment."5 3 It is likely that new
textualists would argue that tolerating any
age-based distinctions violates the goal of
"prohibit[ing] arbitrary age discrimination in
employment." What is it, they would say, if
not "arbitrary age discrimination" when an
employee in the protected class is denied
various privileges solely because of his age?
There is, however, no need to conjecture
about the meaning of this phrase. An
operational definition of "arbitrary
discrimination" appears in the report that
served as the basis for the ADEA. This
report, submitted by Secretary Wirtz,
stressed that "not all discrimination in this
area is arbitrary." The Secretary noted that
the most common form of discrimination
against older workers "involves their
rejection because of the assumptions about
" 29 U.S.C. § 62 1(b) (2000).
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the effect of age on their ability to do a job
when there is in fact no basis for those
assumptions. It is this to which Congress
refers, in Section 715 of the Civil Rights
Act, as arbitrary discrimination." Thus, the
Wirtz report--the very foundation of the
ADEA--recommended legislation tailored to
ending discrimination based upon ageist
stereotypes.
Preferring the relatively older to the
relatively younger, as objectionable as some
might find it, is not at odds with these aims.
Such a preference is not rooted in ageist
stereotypes about the abilities of older
workers, nor does it evince an invidious
intent. By recognizing reverse
discrimination as impermissible, however, a
new textualist approach commits the wrong
it was devised to right. The judiciary usurps
the legislative role, replacing Congress's
voice with its own.
In many cases contradictions and
uncertainties may plague the statutory
backdrop, which would lend legitimacy to
the new textualist method. However, when
the intent is unmistakable, as it is in the
ADEA, reason demands greater sensitivity
and deference to this backdrop.
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02-954 Office of Independent Counsel v. Favish
Ruling Below: (9th Cir., 37 Fed. Appx. 863)
With respect to request under Freedom of Information Act for 10 photographs relating to
death of deputy White House counsel Vincent Foster, district court order ruling that some
photographs are discoverable while others that are so explicit as to violate privacy of
survivors are not discoverable is affirmed, except that one such photograph that district
court had ruled is discoverable is to be withheld.
Question Presented: Under FOIA Exemption 7(C), which protects from disclosure
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" if their production
"could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy," did Office of Independent Counsel properly withhold photographs relating to
death of former deputy White House counsel Vincent Foster?
Allan J. FAVISH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
217 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.)
Decided July 12, 2000.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations
omitted.]
NOONAN, Circuit Judge:
Allan J. Favish appeals the judgment of
the district court granting summary
judgment to the Office of Independent
Counsel (the OIC) in his action under
the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1999) (the FOIA). Favish
seeks 10 photos relating to the death of
Vincent W. Foster, Jr., the Deputy
Counsel to the President. Holding the
OIC has not established that the photos
fall within the privacy exemption of the
FOIA, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand for further
proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On July 20, 1993, Foster was found dead
in Fort Marcy Park. His death was
investigated by the National Park
Service and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and by a committee of the
House and by a committee of the Senate.
See Accuracy in Media v. National Park
Service, 194 F.3d 120 (D.C.Cir.1999). It
was also investigated twice by the OIC.
These inquiries all concluded that Foster
committed suicide.
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Favish is a lawyer not convinced by the
reasoning of these prior investigators
and skeptical of the thoroughness of
their investigations. On January 6, 1997,
he filed his request under the FOIA
seeking from the OIC 150 photocopies
of photographs compiled for law
enforcement purposes. The photos were
identified in the request by reference to
Hearings Related to Madison Guaranty
S & L and the Whitewater Corporation--
Washington, D.C. Phase United States
Senate, 103d Cong. (1994), with the
exception of one photo of a gun in
Foster's hand, identified as having been
published by Time, March 18, 1996 and
on ABC- TV. Favish sought higher
quality copies of these already-published
materials and copies of 9 unpublished
photos. He offered to pay for the
reproduction. On January 24, 1997, the
OIC denied his request, stating that the
photos were exempt under 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(7)(A) (records whose "release
could reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings") and
under § 552(b)(7)(C) (relating to
personal privacy). Favish appealed this
decision to a higher level of the agency.
On February 19, 1997, the OIC denied
his appeal, reiterating the exemptions
asserted but not explaining how they
applied.
On March 6, 1997, Favish filed this suit.
On April 28, 1997, the OIC answered
making no reference to any exemption
and simply denying that Favish was
"entitled to the relief sought." On
January 5, 1998, the OIC filed a Vaughn
index referring to the requested material;
at the same time the OIC released 118
copies of the requested photos in black
and white. Favish withdrew his request
with respect to 21 photos. Eleven photos
remained in dispute, as did Favish's
request for color versions of the photos
released. Both sides moved for summary
judgment.
On March 11, 1998 the district court
gave summary judgment to Favish as to
his request for color photos, to be paid
for by Favish, and as to a photo of
Foster's eyeglasses. As to the 10
remaining photos, the court balanced the
privacy interest of members of the Foster
family against the public interest served
by new copies of the photos, concluded
that the public interest was outweighed
by the privacy interest, and gave
judgment for the OIC. Favish appeals.
The Statutory Exemption Invoked. First,
the OIC denied Favish's request on one
ground that made no sense, viz, that
release of the photos would interfere
with law enforcement proceedings. It
took over a year for the OIC to abandon
this position. The bulk of the photos
requested were already in the public
domain. How higher quality photos
released to Favish would interfere with
law enforcement was not and has not
been explained by an agency under a
statutory duty to comply promptly with a
freedom of information request.
Second, after the OIC did release new
copies of the 118 photos it had withheld
without adequate explanation, it did not
release them in color, nor did it release a
new copy of Foster's eyeglasses. The
OIC has now released copies in color
and a new copy of the eyeglasses photo,
thanks to the order of the district court.
Not appealing that order, the OIC tacitly
admits that it had no legal right to
withhold this material.
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Third, in its answer to Favish's
complaint, the OIC specifically referred
to his request for a new copy of the
photo published in Time, March 18,
1996 and on ABC-TV and stated that the
OIC was "without sufficient information
or knowledge to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations" that the photo
had been published in the forms alleged.
This denial was on its face implausible.
How could the OIC not discover, with a
modicum of diligence, whether a photo
published in national news media had
not come from its files? But the OIC did
not abandon this posture in the ensuing
litigation. In its brief on this appeal, the
OIC declared that it did not concede that
the photo had come from its files and
added that Favish's argument "that the
photograph already has been widely
disseminated" should, therefore, be
rejected. Only on appeal in this court, at
oral argument, did counsel for the OIC
state that it was true that the OIC
possessed the photo referred to in
Favish's request.
In the proceedings before the district
court, although not in its answer, the
OIC invoked this exemption:
(b) This section does not apply to
matters that are
(7) records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of
such law enforcement records or
information ... (C) could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
Here four terms are significant:
"production", that is, the release of the
records, is what must be expected to
have the undesired result; "expected,"
meaning what may be predicted with
probability by a reasonable person, that
is, the standard is objective;
"unwarranted", that is, unjustified by the
purpose of the statute; and "privacy",
that is, a right held dear in our
democracy. The root meaning of privacy
has perhaps been best expressed in the
article that launched its legal career. The
principle is "that of an inviolate
personality." Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To
Privacy, 4 Harv. L.Rev. 193, 205 (1890).
The statutory term, it is worth adding, is
modified by "personal" and is phrased as
"privacy", not "privacy interest."
The statutory command coupled with the
statutory exemption requires "balancing"
of the personal privacy expected by a
reasonable person to be invaded by the
production of the records against the
public purpose served by release.
Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 776,
109 S.Ct. 1468. Deference to the
determination of the agency that the
exemption applies is not due; the burden
of the proof that the request may be
properly denied because of an exemption
rests with the agency. The court "shall
determine the matter de novo." §
552(a)(4)(B). The "burden is on the
agency to sustain its action." Id.
Application of the Statute. Favish's
request focuses on how the OIC
conducted its investigation of Foster's
death. So doing, his request is in
complete conformity with the statutory
purpose that the public know what its
government is up to. Nothing in the
statutory command conditions agency
compliance on the requesting party
showing that he has knowledge of
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misfeasance by the agency, although at
times evidence of such knowledge has
been referred to as enhancing the
urgency of the request. See Hunt v. FBI,
972 F.2d 286, 289 (9th Cir.1992).
Favish, in fact, tenders evidence and
argument which, if believed, would
justify his doubts; but it is not the
function of the court in a FOIA
proceeding to weigh such evidence or
adjudicate such arguments. See
Washington Post Co. v. US. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, 865 F.2d
320, 325 (D.C.Cir.1989).
Nothing in the statutory command
shields an agency from disclosing its
records because other agencies have
engaged in similar investigations. To
anyone familiar with famous cases in the
Old World or in the New it is a feature
of famous cases that they generate
controversy, suspicion, and the desire to
second guess the authorities. The
continuing discussion of the
assassination of President Kennedy may
suffice to make the point. The statute
establishes a right to look, a right to
speculate and argue again, a right of
public scrutiny that can be denied only if
the relevant statutory exemption applies.
The exemption invoked now is the
privacy of "the Foster family members."
The OIC relies on a declaration made
under oath by Sheila Foster Anthony,
Foster's sister, that release of the photos
"would set off another round of intense
scrutiny by the media," leading the
family to be "the focus of conceivably
unsavory and distasteful media
coverage." The family members who
would be distressed by this feared
coverage are identified by Anthony as
Foster's mother, his children, herself,
and Foster's widow.
Strictly speaking, it is not "the
production" of the records that would
cause the harms suggested by the
declaration but their exploitation by the
media including publication on the
Internet. But the statutory reference to
what may "reasonably be expected"
encompasses the probable consequences
of the release. A preliminary question
for decision is whether these
consequences would invade the personal
privacy of persons protected by the
exemption. The question is not free from
difficulty due to the imprecision of the
statutory phrase.
The statute does not identify whose
personal privacy may not be
unjustifiably invaded. The statute
therefore leaves open the possibility that
the exemption does extend to others than
the person to whom the information
relates, although as a matter of first
impression "personal" might seem to
refer only to that person. As it happens,
the question is not one of first
impression in the courts. Release of the
photos of the body of the assassinated
president has been held to invade the
privacy of members of the Kennedy
family. Katz v. National Archives &
Records Administration, 862 F.Supp.
476, 485 (D.D.C.1994), affd on other
grounds, 68 F.3d 1438 (D.C.Cir.1995).
Release of a tape of the last conversation
of the astronauts on the Challenger has
been blocked because it would invade
the privacy of their families. See New
York Times Company v. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration,
920 F.2d 1002, 1009- 10 (D.C.Cir.1990)
and 782 F.Supp. 628 (D.D.C.1991) (on
remand).
It could, no doubt, be suggested that the
president or the astronauts so tragically
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destroyed were special cases, leading to
special solicitude for the feelings of their
families. That would be a constricted
reading of the precedents. What the
cases point to is a zone of privacy in
which a spouse, a parent, a child, a
brother or a sister preserves the memory
of the deceased loved one. To violate
that memory is to invade the personality
of the survivor. The intrusion of the
media would constitute invasion of an
aspect of human personality essential to
being human, the survivor's memory of
the beloved dead.
We hold as a matter of law that the
personal privacy in the statutory
exemption extends to the memory of the
deceased held by those tied closely to
the deceased by blood or love and
therefore that the expectable invasion of
their privacy caused by the release of
records made for law enforcement must
be balanced against the public purpose to
be served by disclosure.
Balancing is one of the most pervasive
and most elusive metaphors in the law.
*** [B]alancing seems to require the
exercise of discernment in a particular
case. Our standard of review of such a
question has been carefully set out in
Schiffer v. The FBI, 78 F.3d 1405 (9th
Cir.1996). Where facts are not in
dispute, we review de novo as a matter
of law the district court's determination
of "whether a document fits within one
of FOIA's prescribed exemptions." See
id at 1409.
We do not, however, have before us all
the relevant facts. The OIC represents
that the 10 withheld photographs are
"graphic, explicit, and extremely
upsetting." That description is not true of
the photo already published in Time and
on television, showing a hand holding a
gun. It may be true of the remaining 9
photos. But no court has ever seen them.
*** [W]hen the agency affidavits are
insufficiently detailed, in camera review
is appropriate. Id. at 1228. Balancing
without a knowledge of what the photos
show would be an exercise in the air.
Accordingly, we return the case to the
district court to examine the photos in
camera and to balance the effect of their
release on the privacy of the Foster
family against the public benefit to be
obtained by their release.
Conclusion. The judgment of the district
court is REVERSED and the case
REMANDED for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that under the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) ("Exemption
7(C)"), Vincent W. Foster Jr.'s surviving
family members have a cognizable
privacy interest in the ten post-mortem
Polaroid photographs of Vincent Foster's
face and body that Appellant Allan J.
Favish has requested. I also agree that
the family's privacy interest in the post-
mortem photographs taken at the scene
of Foster's death by a self-inflicted
gunshot wound must be balanced against
the public's interest in disclosure. I
disagree, however, that remand for an in
camera inspection of the photographs is
necessary before these interests can be
properly balanced. I believe the affidavit
and exhibits contained in the "Vaughn
index" submitted by the Office of
Independent Counsel ("OIC") are
sufficiently detailed to justify
withholding these photographs under
126
Exemption 7(C). I also believe that the
district court properly balanced the
family's privacy interest against the
public's interest in the production of the
photographs and concluded that their
disclosure " 'could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of [the family's] personal
privacy.' " See Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d
286, 287-89 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)). On this basis, I
would hold that the nine, never-before-
released post-mortem Polaroid
photographs of Foster's face and body
are exempt from disclosure under
Exemption 7(C). I would, however,
order the release of the photograph of
Foster's right hand clutching the gun,
which previously appeared in Time
Magazine and other media.
*** I am persuaded that the public's
interest in the OIC's two investigations
of Vincent Foster's death is more than
adequately served by the release of the
118 photographs that Favish has already
obtained from the OIC, the photograph
of Foster's eyeglasses that the district
court ordered released to him, and the
photograph of Foster's right hand
clutching the gun that I believe should
be released to him as well. The public's
interest in disclosure of the remaining
nine, never-before-released post-mortem
Polaroid photographs does not outweigh
the privacy interests of Vincent Foster's
surviving family in their nondisclosure.
Accordingly, under FOIA's Exemption
7(C), the government has established
that their production could reasonably be
expected to constitute an "invasion of
privacy [that] is 'unwarranted.'
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780, 109
S.Ct. 1468.
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Allen J. FAVISH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit
Decided June 6, 2002.
ORDER
The order of the district court of January
11, 2001 is AFFIRMED, except that
photo 3-VF's body looking down from
top of berm is to be withheld.
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I continue to maintain that the record
before the district court before remand
was "sufficiently detailed for the district
court to resolve the issues in this case"
without an in camera review of the ten
photographs at issue. Favish v. OIC, 217
F.3d 1168, 1186 (9th Cir.2000).
Nevertheless, having personally viewed
the ten photographs, I adhere to my prior
conclusion that only the photograph of
Foster's right hand clutching the gun
should be released because "[tihe
public's interest in disclosure of the
remaining nine, never-before- released
post-mortem Polaroid photographs does
not outweigh the privacy interests of
Vincent Foster's surviving family in their
nondisclosure." Id.
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Justices to Rule in Death Photos Case
The release of pictures of Clinton friend and aide Vincent Foster is being contested
by the U.S.
Los Angeles Times
May 6, 2003
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON -- The Supreme Court
announced Monday that it will decide
when the public's right to know about
the government's handling of a tragedy
demands the release of color photos of a
body.
The justices voted to hear the
government's claim that it may shield
from disclosure four close-up photos of
former White House Deputy Counsel
Vincent Foster, who died 10 years ago in
what five separate investigations ruled
was a suicide.
Allan Favish, a Los Angeles lawyer who
suspects that Foster was murdered, has
sought the color photos and won the
right to get some of them under the
Freedom of Information Act.
But the government's top lawyer urged
the Supreme Court to reverse that
decision.
The disclosure law "does not give the
public a generalized 'right to know'
about personal details about private third
parties that happen to be maintained in
government files," argued U.S. Solicitor
General Theodore B. Olson.
Foster's death in 1993 has been
examined by the U.S. Park Police, by
committees of the House and the Senate
and by independent counsels Robert B.
Fiske Jr. and Kenneth W. Starr.
"Favish wants a sixth guess," Olson said,
and "speculation alone" is not enough to
justify requiring the release of the photos
of Foster's body, he said.
The case, Office of the Independent
Counsel vs. Favish, will be heard in the
fall, and it calls on the high court to draw
a line between the, right to public
disclosure and the right to privacy.
The Freedom of Information Act makes
an exception for disclosures that would
"constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," and Foster's widow,
Lisa Foster Moody, and his sister, Sheila
Foster Anthony, filed a brief with the
high court urging that the family's
privacy be respected.
The dispute concerns 10 Polaroid photos
of Foster's body that were taken at Fort
Marcy Park in Virginia, a National Park
Service property overlooking the
Potomac River. Foster's body was found
there just a few hours after he left his
desk at the White House on July 20,
1993.
He was a close friend of President
Clinton and a law partner of Hillary
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Rodham Clinton in a Little Rock, Ark.,
law firm.
Foster left behind a note in his briefcase
expressing his anguish over the rough
treatment given the Clintons and their
staff members, including himself, during
the first six months of the new
administration.
His death triggered another round of
investigations, and the critics of the
Clintons said it showed the president and
his wife had much to hide about their
dealings in Arkansas.
Others, including Favish, suspected that
Foster was murdered by persons
unknown.
The 47-year-old lawyer said he got
interested in the Foster case by reading
about it on the Internet. In 1997, he sued,
seeking 150 photos that were taken at
Fort Marcy, and he has received most of
them.
The court dispute focused on 10 photos
of Foster's body. A judge in Los Angeles
ruled Favish was entitled to have four of
the 10.
He appealed to the high court seeking
the other six. On behalf of the
government, Olson appealed to block the
release of the four, and the justices voted
to take up his appeal.
Copyright C 2003 Los Angeles Times
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Should Public See Foster Death Photos?
Supreme Court Asked to Review FOIA Cases that Pit Benefits of Open Government
Against Survivors' Privacy
Legal Times
February 17, 2003
Tony Mauro
Nearly 10 years after White House
Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster died in a
Northern Virginia park, a contentious
battle over public access to death-scene
photographs is before the Supreme
Court.
While the circumstances of Foster's
apparent suicide are now debated mainly
on the Internet by conspiracy theorists
and critics of former President Bill
Clinton, the access dispute could result
in an important ruling on privacy and the
Freedom of Information Act. Similar
skirmishes over release of autopsy
photos of President John F. Kennedy and
audiotapes of the final moments of the
space shuttle Challenger disaster were
not reviewed by the high court.
Three petitions involving the Foster
photos are among dozens of cases the
Court will consider at its private
conference Feb. 21. At the conference,
the justices will discuss pending cases
and decide which, if any, to add to the
Court's docket for argument and decision
next term.
The three cases are Office of
Independent Counsel v. Allan J. Favish,
No. 02-954; Allan J. Favish v. Office of
Independent Counsel, No. 02-409; and
Sheila Foster Anthony and Lisa Foster
Moody v. Allan J. Favish, No. 02- 599.
Favish is a solo practitioner in Santa
Clara, Calif., who once worked for
Judicial Watch in Washington. Moody is
Foster's widow, and Anthony is one of
his sisters. The Office of Independent
Counsel, which twice investigated
Foster's death, was once led by Kenneth
Starr and is now headed by Julie
Thomas, who is phasing out its
operations.
Two independent counsel investigations,
as well as probes by law enforcement
agencies and congressional committees,
concluded that Foster committed suicide
in July 1993 in Fort Marcy Park in
McLean, Va. But Favish says his "best
guess" is that Foster was murdered. He
invoked FOIA to seek 150 death-scene
and autopsy photos from the
independent counsel in 1997. The
photographs, he contends, could clear up
conflicting reports of whether Foster
suffered a neck wound.
Separate litigation by the conservative
group Accuracy in Media seeking
similar photos from the National Park
Service failed, with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruling that
the surviving family's privacy interests
outweighed the unsubstantiated
allegations of government wrongdoing
that were behind the request for the
photos.
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Favish's FOIA litigation has had several
twists and turns. Says Favish: "I didn't
know what I was getting into when I
started this."
When Favish's FOIA request was
denied, he filed suit in the Central
District of California. A district judge
ruled against him, though the court
ordered some of the photos released. On
appeal, a divided panel of the San
Francisco- based 9th Circuit ruled partly
in Favish's favor. The appeals panel, like
the D.C. Circuit, said Foster's family had
a valid privacy interest. But unlike the
D.C. Circuit, the 9th Circuit said Favish
did not have to justify his request by
demonstrating government misconduct.
The appeals panel ordered a lower court
judge to review the remaining 10 photos
in contention and balance the public
benefit against the privacy interest of the
Foster family. On remand, the judge
ordered the release of five of the 10
photos. When the case went back to the
appeals court, the panel differed with the
trial judge on one photo but ordered four
released.
All of the parties are challenging
different aspects of the ruling and are
asking the high court to step in.
FOIA allows the government to
withhold documents that "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy." But Favish claims that the
exemption only applies to the privacy of
the person who is the subject of the
documents -- not family members. By
expanding the exemption to family
members, Favish says, the 9th Circuit
ruling will give the government an
excuse to hide embarrassing documents
in newsworthy cases where disclosure is
most warranted.
The Foster family, represented by James
Hamilton, a partner at D.C's Swidler
Berlin Shereff Friedman, argues that
Favish should have been required to
submit "compelling evidence of
governmental misconduct to warrant
overriding privacy interests implicated
by such records." Hamilton asserts the
Foster family has already experienced
"acute distress" over the leaked release
of one death-scene photograph --
showing Foster's hand holding the gun
that killed him -- that appeared in Time
magazine.
The independent counsel, represented by
the solicitor general's office, says the
privacy issue needs to be resolved. Its
brief notes that all the circuit courts that
have ruled on the issue say the privacy
exemption of FOIA extends to close
surviving family members.
But the government urged the Supreme
Court to hold the Foster cases pending
the outcome of ATF v. City of Chicago,
No. 02-322. That case, scheduled for
argument March 4, also involves
interpretation of the privacy exemption
of FOIA -- this time in the context of
firearms data kept on gun owners. Both
the Foster family and Favish argue that
the issues in the Chicago case are
different enough that the Court should
grant review of the Foster cases without
delay.
Copyright V 2003 by American Lawyer
Media, ALM LLC
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02-9065 Muhammad v. Close
Ruling Below: (6th Cir., 9/23/02, unpublished)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that state prisoner may not maintain
civil rights action to recover damages for any harm that would render conviction or
sentence invalid unless prisoner has already succeeded in having conviction or sentence
invalidated by state tribunal or called into question by federal court's issuance of writ of
habeas corpus, bars prisoner's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages against corrections
officer alleged to have falsely charged prisoner with misconduct, which resulted in
disciplinary action, in retaliation for prior lawsuits and grievances that prisoner had filed
against officer.
Question Presented: (1) Must plaintiff who wishes to bring Section 1983 suit
challenging only conditions, rather than fact or duration, of his confinement satisfy
favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey? (2) May prison inmate who has
been, but is no longer, in administrative segregation bring Section 1983 suit challenging
conditions of his confinement (i.e., his prior placement in administrative segregation)
without first satisfying favorable termination requirement of Heck v. Humphrey?
Shakur MUHAMMAD, also known as John E. Mease, Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.
Mark CLOSE, Correctional Officer, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals,
For the Sixth Circuit
Decided Sept. 23, 2002.
Before MARTIN, Chief Judge;
MOORE, Circuit Judge; WISEMAN,
District Judge.
Shakur Muhammad appeals a district
court grant of summary judgment for
defendant in this civil rights action filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has
been referred to a panel of the court
pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the
Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this
panel unanimously agrees that oral
argument is not needed. Fed. R.App. P.
34(a).
Muhammad filed his complaint in the
district court alleging that the defendant
corrections officer falsely charged him
with major misconduct threatening
behavior in retaliation for prior lawsuits
and grievances plaintiff filed against
defendant. Plaintiff named defendant in
his individual and official capacities and
sought compensatory and punitive
damages and expungement of the
resulting misconduct conviction on a
reduced charge of insolence. Defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint or for
summary judgment, and plaintiff
responded in opposition and moved for
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leave to amend his complaint. The
magistrate judge recommended that
defendant's motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment be denied and that
plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint
be granted, and defendant filed
objections. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge's recommendation and
denied defendant's motion, and plaintiff
filed an amended complaint.
Thereafter, the magistrate judge
appointed counsel to represent plaintiff,
and defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The magistrate
judge recommended that the motion to
dismiss be denied, and defendant filed
objections. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge's recommendation and
denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
Following discovery, defendant again
moved the district court for summary
judgment, plaintiff responded in
opposition, and defendant submitted a
reply. The magistrate judge
recommended that summary judgment
for defendant be granted, and the district
court granted plaintiff leave to file pro se
objections after counsel declined to do
so. The district court adopted the
magistrate judge's recommendation and
granted summary judgment for
defendant. Plaintiff filed a timely notice
of appeal pro se. On appeal, plaintiff
contends that he established a genuine
issue of material fact remaining for trial
with respect to whether defendant
retaliated against him in violation of the
First Amendment. Defendant responds
that the district court's judgment was
proper.
Upon de novo review, see Brooks v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 932 F.2d 495, 500 (6th
Cir.1991), we affirm the judgment of the
district court. The plaintiff seeks
punitive and compensatory damages and
requests that "the misconduct charge
[be] expunged from his file." J.A. at 14.
Thus this case falls directly within the
doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383
(1994), which this circuit applied to a
prisoner seeking damages and
expungement of a disciplinary infraction
in Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th
Cir.2000). "In order to grant the plaintiff
in this case the relief he seeks, we would
have to unwind the judgment of the state
agency." Id at 230. Thus Heck bars the
plaintiffs action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, the district court's
judgment is affirmed. See Rule
34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
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Supreme Court Accepts Appeal From Inmate
AP Online
June 16, 2003
Gina Holland
WASHINGTON (AP) - The Supreme
Court agreed Monday to hear the
complaints of a Michigan prisoner who,
acting as his own lawyer, alleged
mistreatment in an appeal written in
neatly printed block lettering. Thousands
of so-called pauper appeals are filed
each year by people with no money, and
sometimes no attorney. The chance of
having a case chosen by justices for an
oral argument is tiny. Just 80 or so cases
make it to the docket each year, and only
a handful of those are indigent cases.
Justices said they would consider
whether lower courts wrongly dismissed
a lawsuit filed by Shakur Muhammad,
also known as John Eugene Mease, who
claims that prison staff retaliated against
him for filing multiple jailhouse
lawsuits.
Muhammad argued that his free-speech
rights were violated when an officer at a
state prison accused him of threatening
behavior - after Muhammad twice sued
the officer. Muhammad was punished
with detention and loss of privileges.
Muhammad, 41, penned his appeal from
prison in lonia, Mich., described as a
top-security facility for inmates who
cause problems at other prisons.
The Supreme Court waived filing fees
because Muhammad is indigent. He said
he lives on $9 a month, for stamps and
cosmetics.
He is serving time for a sex offense and
a conviction for assault with attempt to
murder. At the earliest, he can be freed
in 2025, according to state records.
The Supreme Court named Muhammad
an attorney. His case raises technical
questions for the court, involving when
inmate suits are allowed.
David Santacroce, a law professor at the
University of Michigan, said
Muhammad beat the odds by winning
Supreme Court review, but is not
guaranteed a victory. "It's not a friendly
place for prisoners," the professor said.
The case is Muhammad v. Close, 02-
9065.
Copyright V 2003 The Associated Press.
All Rights Reserved.
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Heck v. Humphrey: What Should State Prisoners use When Seeking Damages from
State Officials... Section 1983 or Federal Habeas Corpus?
New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement
Winter 1996
Eric J. Savoy
[Excerpt; some footnotes omitted.]
On June 24, 1994, the United States
Supreme Court decided the case of Heck
v. Humphrey.' The issue presented in the
case was "whether a state prisoner may
challenge the constitutionality of his
conviction in a suit for damages under
42 U.S.C. §19832 .3*
The issue of damages, or more broadly
stated, remedies, becomes even more
complicated when a section 1983 suit is
brought by a prisoner. Prior to Heck v.
Humphrey, the leading Supreme Court
case on this issue was Preiser v.
114 S. Ct. 2364.
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
Id
3 Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. at 2368.
Rodriguez. In Preiser, New York state
prisoners "sought injunctive relief to
compel restoration of the (good-conduct-
time) credits, which . . . would result in
immediate release from confinement in
prison." Rodriguez sought to restore his
good-conduct-time credits by filing a
section 1983 suit against the New York
State Department of Correctional
Services. Rodriguez, however, did not
seek damages.
The fact that Rodriguez sought release
from prison is important. The United
States Supreme Court held "that when a
state prisoner is challenging the very fact
or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is
a determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release
from that imprisonment, his sole federal
remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." In
other words, given the type of relief
Rodriguez sought, a section 1983
complaint was improper.
The Supreme Court also discussed the
issue of damages in its Preiser opinion.
The Court stated:
If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he
is attacking something other than the fact
or length of his confinement, and he is
seeking something other than immediate
or more speedy re lease--the traditional
purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of
136
a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an
appropriate or available federal remedy.
Accordingly . . . a damages action by a
state prisoner could be brought under
(section 1983) in federal court ....
. . .[T]he Court in Humphrey does not
follow this analysis.
Finally, there is one major advantage to
filing a section 1983 complaint, as
opposed to a normal civil suit brought
for a constitutional violation, or federal
habeas corpus. In a section 1983 case,
not only would damages be awarded to a
successful plaintiff, but attorneys' fees
could be recovered as well....
The United States Supreme Court
granted Heck's petition for certiorari to
resolve the issue of "whether a state
prisoner may challenge the
constitutionality of his conviction in a
suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983."4 The Court held that a claim for
damages by a state prisoner under
section 1983 is an action to challenge the
legality of the conviction. Therefore, the
Court went on to state, Heck's claim
could not be brought under section 1983
at all. As a result, the Court affirmed the
Seventh Circuit's dismissal of Heck's
section 1983 complaint.
The Supreme Court compared a section
1983 action to a common law tort claim.
When an action for damages is brought
to compensate for the alleged violation
of an individual's rights, the proper
starting point is the law of torts. After
analyzing this area of the law, the Court
held that a section 1983 plaintiff,
' Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2368
(1994).
seeking damages by challenging the
legality of his or her conviction, is
analogous to the common law tort action
of malicious prosecution. In order to
assert a successful cause of action for
malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
prove the "termination of the prior
criminal proceeding in favor of the
accused (plaintiff)."
The Court used the theory of malicious
prosecution and applied it to Heck's
section 1983 complaint:
We hold that, in order to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a S 1983 plaintiff
must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus ....
Since Heck's conviction for voluntary
manslaughter was affirmed by the
Indiana Supreme Court, his section 1983
claim did not fall within the Supreme
Court's tort analysis, and he was not
allowed to recover damages.
The United States Supreme Court's
decision in Heck v. Humphrey was long
awaited. The number of state prisoners
bringing claims under section 1983 for
unconstitutional confinement or
conviction has steadily increased over
the past twenty years. The last Supreme
Court case to analyze the potential
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conflict between section 1983 and the
federal habeas corpus statute, Preiser v.
Rodriguez, was decided over twenty
years ago. Since then, the federal courts
have had trouble deciding whether state
prisoners can bring damages actions
against state officials for
unconstitutional confinement under
section 1983.
As discussed above, the anticipated
Supreme Court case has made a complex
area of the law even more complicated.
Instead of using the analysis in its
Preiser decision, the Court based its
decision on the common law of torts and
the cause of action of malicious
prosecution same result by relying on the
central holding in Preiser, which
indicated that a prisoner could not bring
a section 1983 suit if he was challenging
the very fact or length of his
confinement, and abolishing its dicta,
which stated that a section 1983 claim
for damages could be brought by a state
prisoner. Instead, the Court held that a
prisoner could not bring a section 1983
claim for damages challenging the fact
or duration of his confinement, unless
the criminal proceeding initiated against
him has been terminated in his favor.
Also, the Court seems to require a state
prisoner to exhaust state remedies in
state court before seeking relief in
federal court under section 1983. Prior
Supreme Court decisions have indicated
that there is no exhaustion requirement
for section 1983. The Court, in its
decision, has not only changed its
position in numerous cases previously
decided, but has also foreclosed yet
another avenue for state prisoners
seeking relief.
Copyright C 1996 New England Journal
on Criminal and Civil Confinement; Eric
J. Savoy
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Also This Term:
02-763 Barnhart v. Thomas
Ruling Below: (3d Cir., 294 F.3d 568, 71 U.S.L.W. 1028)
Social Security Act's definition of "disability," which includes inability to engage in "any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy," 42 U.S.C. §
423(d), means that Social Security disability insurance claimant's ability to perform
previous work does not foreclose eligibility for benefits if such work no longer exists in
national economy.
Question Presented: May commissioner of Social Security determine that claimant is
not "disabled" within meaning of Social Security Act because claimant remains
physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without considering whether that
particular job exists in significant numbers in national economy?
02-1205 Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.
Ruling Below: (7th Cir., 305 F.3d 717, 71 U.S.L.W. 1174, 90 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 939)
Four-year catchall statute of limitations for civil actions arising "under an Act of
Congress enacted after" Dec. 1, 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, does not apply to post-hire
employment discrimination claims made actionable by 1991 amendments to 42 U.S.C. §
1981.
Question Presented: Does four-year catchall limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 1658
apply to new causes of action created by 1991 Civil Rights Act that were codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a) and (b)?
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